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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to propose methods that incorporate quity concerns into cost 
utility analysis. The focus of the paper is on QALYs. but the results apply to health utility 
indices in general. Two interpretations ofQALYs are considered: QALYs as (yon Neunmnn 
Morgenstem) utilities and QALYs as measures of health. A justification is provided for 
aggregating consistently .scaled "'QALYs as utilities" over individuals. The conditions 
underlying unweighted aggregation f QALYs are identified. These conditions exclude two 
common types of equity concern. Algorithms are proposed that take into account equity 
concerns and that are relatively e~y to apply. 
JEL clas.sificati+m: 1 !0 
Keyword~: Equity: Uiility tbzory; S~ia! c.hoice theory.: He',,dth: Cost utility analysis 
1. Introduction 
Utility indices for health care programmes, uch as QALYs, have been criti- 
cized for being primarily concerned with efficiency, ignoring equity implications 
(see, for example, Lockwood 0988);  Harris (1988); Smith (1987); Broome 
(1988); Broome (1993)). The importance of incorporating equity considerations 
into cost utility analysis has been widely acknowledged by researchers in the field 
(e.g. Williams, 1993). However, despite stmements of intent, few attempts have 
been made thus far to actually develop methods by means of which equity 
considerations can be taken into account in cost utility analysis. One of the few 
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excei~ions i Wagstaff (1991)o who suggested combining equity and efficiency 
considerations ia cost utility analysis by means of the social welfare function 
underlying Atkinson's index of inequality (Afldnson, 1970). However, Wagstaff 
did not pursue this idea any further, and in particular did not indicate how the 
parameu~rs of this social welfare function can be assessed by expedmemal 
methods. 
The aim of this paper is to derive functional forms that allow trading off the 
efficieney gains of a health care programme against their equity implications. 
Given that QALYs are the most frequently used outcome measure in cost utility 
analysis, we will refer to the gains of a health care programme as the number of 
QALYs gained. However, it should be emphasized here that all results derived in 
the sequel of the paper apply to other utility-based outcome measures as well. it is 
als~ impovumt to realize that this paper is concerned with equity concerns over 
consistently scaled QALYs, consistent in the .sense that QALYs are comparable 
over imJ[viduals. This distinguishes this paper for example from the paper by 
Gafni and Birch (1991), in which the influence of equity considerations on the 
scaling of the yon Neumann Morgenstern utility function is shown and in which 
algo,ithms are developed to ensure consistent scaling. However, the two ap- 
proac~s are not completely indepeiidcnt. We briefly return to this issue in Section 
6. 
The functional derivations presented in this paper are based on the tools of 
muhi-auribute utility theory. Multi-attribute utility theory has been developed as a 
lmacedure to make explicit the trade-off between conflicting objectives. Two 
interpretations of QALYs that have been distinguished in the literature are 
considered: QALYs as yon Neumann Morgenstern (vNM) utilities and QALYs as 
measures of health. ~ It has been claimed that the QALYs as utilities approach 
lacks a theoretical foundation, since utilities cannot be interpersonally compared in 
a meaningful way. This problem is addressed in Sections 3 and 4. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discuses the two interpreta- 
tions of QALYs. Sections 3 and 4 provide a rationale for aggregating consistently 
scaled "'QALYs as utilities" over individuals. In Section 3 it is argued that if we 
~am to i_nc .orporate quity considerations in cost utility analysis, full interpersonal 
comparability of utilities is requi~ed, in Section 4 an argument is presented that 
vNM utilities c,:m meaningfully be interpersonally compared. In Section 5 the 
conditions axe identified under which the aggregation of QALYs over individuals 
takes the form of "'QALY-utilitarianism,'" i.e. the unweighted summation of 
QALYs over individuals. Section 6 shows that these conditions inhibit the 
inc|us[on of two common types of equity concern: a concern for the fairness of the 
allocation process, generally referred to as ex ante equity, and a concern for the 
1hose t~o iu~e~-" lion.,, axe not neces.,,afily mutually exclusive. 
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(final) distributional implications, referred to as ex post equity. Replacing the 
relevant conditions by alternative conditions allows the inclusion of ex ante and ex 
post equity concerns. In Sections 7 and 8 three procedures are proposed by means 
of which equity concerns can be captured in cost utility analysis. The procedures 
described in Section 7 only address ex post equity. In Section 8 a procedure is 
described that simultaneously takes into account ex ante equity and ex post equity. 
Section 9 contains a summary "and discussion of the main findings of the paper. 
Appendix A contains proofs of results presented in the main text of the paper. 
2. Interpretat ions of QALYs 
The definition of the number of QALYs for an individual, as given by Pliskin 
et al. (1980), is the following: -" 
T 
QALY= ~.,u( q,) (1) 
t=|  
where T stands for the number of periods remaining the individual still has to li,+'e, 
q, stands for the quality of life level attained in period t and u(q,) is the utility of 
living in health state q, at period t. At least two interpretations have been 
distinguished in the literature 3 as to what the number of QALYs represents 
QALYs as vNM utilities and QALYs as measures of health. According to 
Torrance (1986): "+In one approach ealth state utilities are claimed to be utile, ties 
obeying the axioms of von Neumann Morgenstern utility theory...In the otis.: 
approach...health state utilities are claimed to measure the overall quality of ilL"" 
(p. 27). 
With respect to the first interpretation, QALYs as vNM utilities, cooditiorls 
have to be imposed on the individual preference relation to ensure that a QALY is 
a valid vNM utility. Criticism that decision making based on QALYs may not 
accurately reflect individual preferences i based on the presumption that ideally a 
QALY should be a vNM utility. In the interpretation of QALYs as vNM utilities, 
we abstract from the discussion whether the conditions that equate QALYs and 
vNM utilities are reasonable and it is simply assumed that the individual prefer- 
ence relations satisfy these conditions (for a critical evaluation of these condition 
see, for example, Mehrez and Gafni (1989), Loomes ~d McKenzie (1989)). 
" One may object against this formulation i that it is unnecessarily simple ~ that. for example. 
di~ounting should be 'allowed for. However+ this simple tepre~nh~ion does not imply a loss of 
generality interms of the results of this paper: all results carry over ~raighfforwardly if amore general 
exwession is substituted. 
Nord (1994) provides a third interlnCtalion: QALYs a+s a social valne. We will not conskicr this 
interpretation forthe obvious reasolj that in this interpretmion aggregation plays no rol~. 
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However. it should be noted that if the preference conditions underlying the 
QALY measure are not satisfied, another utility-based outcome measure can 
siw~ly be substituted. As remarked already in the Introduction, all results pre- 
sonted in the remainder of the paper apply to other utility-based measures as well. 
The second interaretatio~, QALYs as measures of health, is rooted in the 
extra-welfarist tradition which originates from Sen (1979) and which has been 
applied to health by Culyer (1989). Wagstaff (I 99 I) states the following: "'Though 
utility theory is frequently used in the derivation of quality of life scores, it is used 
simply to measure people's health rather than the utility they derive from it" (p. 
23). Part of the appeal of this latter approach stems from the fact that the 
comparability of "'QALYs as utilities" across individuals may be problematic. 
It is not an aim of this paper to decide which of these two interpretations is 
most appropriate. The equity algorithms presented in Sections 7 and 8 have been 
developed with the intention of being applicable under both interpretations. 
However. equity considerations relate to comparisons between individuals and 
therefore it has to be established first whether QALYs can be aggregated in both 
interpretations. The common way to aggregate QALYs is by unweighted summa- 
tion. Because of this, the QALY approach as been criticized as embodying a
return to classical, or Benthamite, utilitarianism. Wagstaff (1991) has argued that 
in the ~nterpretation of QALYs as measures of health this criticism does not stand 
scrutiny. Classical utilitarianism focuses on the aggregation of utilities wb : eas the 
QALYs as measure of health approach mainly sees QALYs as reflecting character- 
istics of people wi~aut being concerned with the utility they derive from these 
characteristics. The idea behind this line of argument is that characteristics do not 
face problems of measurability and comparability across individuals. In the 
~eir~r.,dcr of this p-~aper this view is taken for granted. It is assumed that in the 
interpretation as a health measure, QALYs can indeed be aggregated across 
individuals and that the equity algorithms to be developed later can be applied to 
QALYs as measures of health. 
The asse~ion made in this paper that QALYs as vNM utilities can also be 
meaningfully aggregated requires clarification. The question whether vNM utilities 
are interpersonally comparable and do have a meaning in social welfare analysis 
has provoked much debate over the past five decades. In the next section we will 
establish that to incorporate quity considerations into cost utility analysis full 
interpersonal comparability of utilities is necessary. In Section 4 a rationale is 
given why QALYs as vNM utilities can be considered to be fully interpersonally 
comparable. 
3. Agg,~regafioa f_ utilities 
Under classical utilitarianism social welfare was set equal to the sum of 
intuitively measurable and comparable individual utilities. These individual utili- 
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ties were simply assumed to exist; no attention being paid to their origin. This 
concept of utility and social welfare was challenged by the Pareto school, which 
claimed that utility is an ordinal concept, reflecting only the individual ordering of 
outcomes and being incomparable across individuals. Arrow's work on social 
choice lies within this Paretian tradition. In deriving his celebrated impossibility 
theorem 4 Arrow defined a social welfare function (SWF) as a functional relation 
specifying a social ordering for any given n-tuple of individual orderingso By 
using only ordering information Arrow deliberately limited the informational 
framework, excluding all information on preference intensities. Arrow showed that 
if the number of individuals is finite and if the number of social states is greater 
than two, no SWF can satisfy the following four conditions: (i) unrestricted 
domain--the SWF should work for all logically possible individual orderings; (ii) 
weak Pareto--if every individual strictly prefers allocation x to allocation y tben 
society should strictly prefer x !0 y; (iii) non-d/ctatorsbip---there is no individual 
such that social preference is completely determined by the preferences of this 
individual regardless of the preferences of all other individuals in society; (iv) 
independence of irrelevant alternatives--social preference between two allocations 
should be independent of all other allocations. Tbe requirement of independence of 
irrelevant alternatives xcludes all information about other allocations and thereby 
inhibits the use of any information other than the individual orderings over x and 
y. Using information on cardinal utility depends on the scaling of the utility 
function and this necessarily involves taking into account other alternatives. 
Various attempts have been undertaken to escape from Arrow's impossibility 
theorem by weakening his conditions. In this paper we consider the enrichment of 
the informational base of Arrow's social choice approach, i.e. a relaxation of 
Arrow's fourth condition, independence of irrelevant alternatives. A social welfare 
functional (SWFL) is defined as a rule that specifies exactly one social ordering 
for any given n-tuple of rea!-valued individual utility functions. Let L i be defined 
as the set of individual utility functions that are informationally equivalent, i.e. 
that provide the same information on individual preferences. For example, given 
Arrow's assumptions, all individual utility functions that are positive monotonic 
transformations are informationally equivalent. If individual utility is cardinally 
measurable, ~en e!ements of the set Li of informationally equivalent utility 
functions are positive linear transformations of each other: U~ = a + bU/, a ¢ R; 
b>O; U~, U~'~L,. 
A measurability set L is defined as the set of all possible combinations of the 
4 See Arrow (1950. 1951a). In t.he~ two works of Arrow the domain restriction was not defined 
tight enough a.s was pointed out by Bhu {1957)..Th.¢ ~.ersion i the second edition of the 1951 work 
(1963) is the best-known version. 
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n-tuples of infommtionaily equivalent individual utility functions. Depending on 
the assumptions about interpersonal comparability, the measurability set can be 
restricted. Combining the measurability assumptions about individual utilities with 
the assump~/ons about interpersonal comparability defines the measurability-com- 
partiality set L *. In Arrow's framework of social choice, where no interpersonal 
co~bi l i ty  is assumed and only the information revealed by individual order- 
ings is incorporated. L * consists of all individual utility functions that are positive 
mon~onic transformations of each other. Sen (1970, 1977) distinguishes several 
other measurability-comparability combinations: 
• cardinal non-comparability--L * consists of all individual utility functions that 
are unique up to positive linear transformations; 
• o~inal evel comparability--L * consists of all individual utility functions that 
are unique up to similar positive monotonic transformations: 
• cardinal unit comparability--L * consists of all individual utility functions that 
are unique up to location and common scale, i.e. U = a~ + bU~ *. a~ ~ R (the 
set of real numbers), b > 0: 
- cardinal full comparability--L * consists of all individual utility functions that 
are unique up to common location and common scale, i.e. U~ = a + bU, *. 
a~R.b>O.  
Lenuna 8*2 in Sen (1970) shows that assuming cardinal non-comparability s 
not sufficient o solve Arrow's impossibility result. However, the other three 
informational frameworks are sufficient to remove the dilemma posed by Arrow's 
theorem. Clearly. it is interpersonal comparability hat is crucial in enriching the 
informational basis of social choice. 
In cost ulility analysis the calculation of the net advantage of one programme 
over anger  is of interest. For such an analysis to he relevant, units should he 
comparable. Location need not necessarily he common to all individuals, since in 
calculating net advantages the individual-specific locations are subtracted away 
and play no rote in determining the relative ffectiveness of programmes. Suppose 
for example that for a particular n-tuple of individual utility functions programme. 
x is preferred to programme y. That is. Y'-[L,~(x~) - oi~"~ Y " ,J~l > 0, but also ,~-[a~ +
bU,( x~) - a~ + b~(  y~)] = bE[U,( x~) - U~( yi)] > O, a~ ~ R and b > O, and thus 
adding individual specific onstants does not influence the relative ffectiveness of 
[n'ogrammes. If b would be individual specific, which corresponds with cardinal 
non-comDarability, x might no longer he preferred to y. This suggests that in cost 
utility analyses we need only impose cardinal utility functions that have their scale 
in common, i.e. cardinal unit comparability. It seems not necessary to assume level 
comparability. However, several authors (e.g. d'Aspremont and Gevers (1977); 
Sen (1977): Deschamps and Gevers (1978)) have shown that if cardinal unit 
comparability is assumed rather thzm cardinal full comparability, slightly strength- 
ened versions of Arrow's conditions imply that the only possible SWFL is the 
utilitarian one. In such an informational framework, simply aggregating the 
number of utilities/QALYs over the relevant population is unobjectionable. This 
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result was to be expected. The notion of equity involves special connsideration 
being given to the badly off and this necessarily involves bringing in comparisons 
of utility levels. Given that the starting point of this paper was a concern for the 
equity consequences of utility-based ecision making, a framework has to he 
imposed that allows such concerns to be justified. That is, a rationale must be 
given for assuming cardinal full comparability. 
4. von Neumann Morgenstern utilities 
If the vNM axioms hold then individual utility functions are cardinal, i.e. 
unique up to positive linear transformations. A possibility is therefore to use 
individual vNM utilities as an input in the social welfare functional. Taking 
individual vNM utilities as the basis from which social welfare judgements are to 
be derived was first proposed by Harsanyi (1955). Harsanyi's position has been 
severely criticized. The essence of the criticism was that vNM utilities are 
inextricably bound to situations involving risk. Arrow (1951a, p. 10): "...it (vNM 
utility theory) has nothing to do with welfare considerations, particularly if we are 
interested primarily in making a social choice among alternative policies in which 
no random elements enter. To say otherwise would be to assert hat the disiribu- 
tion of the social income is to he governed by the tastes of individuals for 
gambling." 
One can respond to such criticism in one of two ways, The first type of answer 
acknowledges that vNM utilities are only relevant in tlk~ context of risk, but asserts 
that health decision making typically involves risk and that, therefore, vNM 
utilities do have relevance in this context (e.g. Ben-Zion and Gafni 0983)). The 
second type of response challenges the assertion that vNM utilities only have 
relevance in the context of risk. According to this line of reasoning, cardinal utility 
has a meaning independent of risk. That cardinal ut:dity has a meaning independent 
of risk has been criticized by Arrow (1951b) who writes about cardinal utility 
under certainty: "'...which is a meaningless concept anyway" (p. 425). Similar 
views have boca expressed by Savage (1954), Ellsherg (1954), Luce and Raiffa 
(1957) and Fishbum (1989). Harsanyi (1987) on the other hand asserts that: "In 
fact, people's vNM utility functions are an important piece of information for 
welfare economics and ethics because they are natural measures for the intensity 
of people's desires, preferences and wants" (pp. 546-547). Wakker (1994) 
provides a defense for a unified notion of utility that does not need risk for its 
existence, but that has relevance for risk. Wakker observes that the development of
expected utility theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern was motivated by their 
desire to obtain a cardinal utility that is relevant to game theory. The same cardinal 
utility, the expectation of which represents individual choices over lotteries over 
outcomes, is used as a unit of exchange between players in a game. Wakker (p. 8): 
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"'l think the applicability of risky utility as means of exchange between players is 
as quesfionab/c ~ ;is . . . . . . . . .  ~ : -~k: l :~ ,  t~,, !~,~!fnre . . . . . . . .  theory., or any other case of decisions 
under certainty.'" It canno~ be excluded that vNM had in mind one notion of utility 
for the emile economic science. Tiffs viewpoint, that vNM utilities do indeed have 
relevance in other contexts than risk, underlies the discussion of QALYs as vNM 
utilities in this paper. 
Having provided a rationale for using cardinal (vNM) utilities as the foundation 
of social welfare judgements, the question remains how interpersonal comparabil- 
ivy can be ensured given that individual utilities are unique only up to positive 
linear transformations and given that scaling up the utility of one individual, while 
keeping the utilities of the other individuals constant, may alter the outcome of the 
social choice problem. Hildreth (1953) suggested considering two specially de- 
freed oetcomes X and Y, such that everyone prefers X to Y, and to assign 
predefined real values to these social states. This makes individual utility functions 
interpersonally comparable. In fact this approach is typically used in cost utility 
analysis. The general approach to aggregation, as outlined for example by 
Williams (1981) and Torrance (1986), is to assign a utility of zero to death and a 
utility of one to nomml or full health and to regard a year of healthy life as being 
of equal intrinsic value to everyone. Torrance and Feeny (1989) have argued that it 
may be more in line with existing practice to assume that a life in full health has 
equal value for everyone. Applying this scaling, n~reover, avoids the problem that 
utilities have to be assigned to health states without specifying the time dimension 
of the health s~!es. Gafni and Torrance (1984) have argued that health states have 
a time dimension inextricably hound to them and that it is impossible to measure 
utilRh~s for health without specifying a time dimension. Gafni and Birch (1991) 
have argued that the common way to measure vNM utilities is inconsistent with 
the criterion that a life in full health is of equal value to everyone. They have 
provided an algorithm to measure utilities that are consistent with this criterion. In 
their approach the vNM utility function is scaled such that a life in full health 
receives mility one and immediate death utility zero. This approach guarantees that 
individual  utilities are consistently scaled and interpersonally comparable. A
disadvantage of the method proposed by Gafni and Birch is that t~o rather that 
one standard gamble questions are necessary to dete_n:n_ i e health state utilities. The 
measurement task therefore becomes more involved. 
Summarizing, the above discussion establishes a rationale for aggregating 
QALYs as (vNM) utilities. Section 3 showed the need for cardinal fully compara- 
ble utilities if we are to allow distributional considerations to play a role in cost 
utility analysis, vNM utility theory establishes cardinality of the individual utili- 
ties. Following Wakker's argument a case can be made for the assertion that vNM 
utilities do indeed have relevance in the context of welfare judgments. Finally, by 
Hildreth's approach, which is typically followed in cost utility analysis, a consis- 
tent scaling procedure emerges, which ensures that individual vNM utilities can be 
interpersonally compared in a meaningful way. 
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5. QALY utilitarianism 
5.1. Notation and stnlctural assumptions 
This subsection introduces notation and structural assumptions. Denote the set 
of QALY allocations by X. A typical element of the set X is a vector x = (x t . . . . .  
x n) representing an allocation of QALYs resulting from the implementation f a 
health care programme with each xi indicating the number of QALYs received by 
individual i and n being the number of individuals affected by the programme. 
Assume without loss of generality that for each individual the possible number of 
QALYs is non-negative, i.e. X~ R+. We are interested in the social preference 
relation over the set of QALY allocations, meaning "'at least as good as". Let >- 
and ~ denote its asymmetric and symmetric part, respectively. Throughout > is 
assumed to he a weak order. That is, _> is complete, either x >_ y or y >_ x or both, 
and transitive, if x >_ y and y _> z then x >_ z. Moreover, >_ is assumed to be 
continuous. Continuity of the preference relation guarantees that if a real-valued 
function is defined over X, this function has an interval as its image. 
Denote by x_ it, i the vector x with coordinate i (the number of QALYs 
individual i receives)replaced by vi: x_ iv i=(x l ,  x 2 . . . . .  xi_ 1, v i. xi+ I . . . . .  
x~). Let A he a subset of the individuals affected by a health care programme: 
A c l=  {l, 2 . . . . .  n}. Then x_ at:A denotes the vector x in which for all 
individuals in subset A x i is replaced by c i. For example if A = {l, 2, 3}, then 
X-AUA =(/ '1 '  /'2' U3" X4 . . . . .  Xn). Denote by >-i the individual preference 
relation "at least as good as". As before, >-~ and ~~ are defined as the 
asymmetric and symmeuic part of > ,, respectively. 
Let Z be a set of probability distributions over the set of QALY allocations X. 
A typical element of Z is (p l  x ~ . . . . .  pm x m) where allocation x~ occurs with 
probability pJ and m can be any natural number. Let >_. : be a .social preference 
relation defined on Z. Throughout t._he paper it is assumed that individual prefer- 
ence relations over probability distributions satisfy the yon Neumann Morgenstem 
(vNM) axioms. In the formulation by Jensen (1967), a preference relation > '  
satisfies the vNM axioms if: (i) > '  is a weak order; (ii) vNM independence, 
P~'Q '~( I~P  +( I  - / z )R)> ' (p ,Q+( I  - / z )R)WO< /z < I and P, Q, R~_Z; 
(iii) Jonson continuity, ( P >-' Q, Q >- ' R) =* KP + (1 - K )R >-' Q and Q >- 'pP + (1 
- p)R  for some K, p c~ (0, 1). I fa  preference r lation satisfies the vNM axioms, a 
cardinal real-valued utility function exists, the expected value of which represents 
the preference relation. 
5.2. Derication of  QALY utilitarianism 
We will derive (QALY) utilitarianism by adding a condition to the axiomatic 
framework of Harsanyi (1955) in which a partial characterization f utilitarianism 
is given. The method of proof differs from the proof given by Harsanyi in that use 
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iS made of a result developed by Fishbum (1965). Furthermore, by using a 
theorem from Maas and Wakker (1994) the utility function is shown to he 
continuous. Continuity is important o establish, If QALYs (real numbers) are 
added up across individuals the social utility function is implicitly assumed to be 
continuous. However Harsanyi's result does not imply this. 
Hars~a~yi Rot s.~liy ic~::;;¢~, :.~-.;.';;.~u2! py~for~n~'eg to satisfy the vNM axioms, 
as has been assumed in Section 5. !. but also required social preferences to satisfy 
the vNM axioms. According to Harsanyi the vNM axioms are essential require- 
menLs of rationality, much in the same spirit as Arrow considered weak ordering to 
be a basic requirement of rationality of social preferences. Furthermore, Harsanyi 
imposed the following condition: 
Condition H~i f  two "alternatives, defined by probability distributions over the 
set of outcomes, are indifferent from the standpoint of eyeD" individual, then 
they are also indifferent from a social standpoint. 
As shown by Harsanyi (theorem V), the~ three conditions allow the derivation 
of the SWFL as a weighted sum of the individual utilities: 
u{~)  = ~: ~u~(.,~,) (2) 
This is not a full characterization f QALY-util~itarianism, given that the scaling 
factors A~ may differ between individuals and the utility functions are indivMual- 
specific. QALYs are assumed to he similar across individuals. Therefore a 
condition has to be added to ensure this simil~:y. 
A permutation ¢r of the n individuals is a function specifying a rearrangement 
of the individuals. Denote by ~r(i) the permuted value of i. Now consider the 
following condition: 
Condition A (anonymity)--(/.~)  =(U~qi}) for all (U,)= (U~ . . . . .  U,,) and per- 
mutation functions ¢r on ! = { I . . . . .  n}. 
Condition A asserts that social indifference should hold between a utility/QALY 
allocation x and any utility/QALY allocation y which is a permutation ef x. 
Condition A ensures that social preference is independent of who gets which 
utility/QALY. For example, in the hypothetical situation that there is one 
additior~,l QALY to be divided between two individuals with a similar endowment 
of QALYs s by condition A. society should have no preference as to which 
individual will receive this additional QALY. However, condition A is weaker 
than what is referred to in the cost utility literature as "'a QALY is a QALY no 
matter who gets it". According to the latter, society should in every situation be 
indifferent wilh respect o who gets a QALY. Condition A only says that in case 
Note th;~ the impact of od~er ndowments, e.g. income, isignored by condition A. The~ could be 
im:orpor~'d bym,~ing health mi|ifies dependent of the~ endowments. For example, if health state 
u~il~t~es ~ incoff~e dependent, condition A has imp|/cations forincome dependent health utilities. 
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one QALY allocation is a permutation of another, indifference should hold. For 
example, suppose a programme has resulted in a QALY allocation (3, !), i.e. 
individual a has received three QALYs and individual b has received one QALY, 
and one more QALY is to be allocated. Then by the argument that "a QALY is a 
QALY no matter who gets it" society should be indifferent between allocations 
(4, 1) and (3, 2). However, condition A does not provide guidance with respect to 
social prelerence ~tween (4, i) anti (3, 2). Co,~iition A asserts tirol if society 
prefers (3, 2) to (4, 1) then it should also prefer (2, 3) to (1, 4) when the initial 
allocation is (1, 3): by condition A (2, 3) ",- :(3, 2), we know that (3, 2) >- :(4, !), 
applying condition A once again gives (4, 1) ,,, :(1, 4) and thus by transitivity (2, 
3) >- :(I, 4). Imposing condition A on top of Harsanyi's conditions is necessary 
and sufficient for QALY u:ilitarianism. 
Theorem l--the following two statements are equivalent: 
(i) The social preference r lation > : can he represented by QALY utilitarian- 
ism: 
n 
u(x) = Ev(~, )  (3) 
i=1  
(ii) Both individual and social preferences , atisfy the vNM axioms and more- 
over conditions H and A hold. Furthermore, U is continuous and unique up to 
positive linear transformations. 
A proof of this result can be found in Appendix A. 
6. Ex ante versus ex post equity 
Theorem i has been derived by imposing four conditions: that individual 
preferences satisfy the vNM axioms, that social preferences satisfy the vNM 
axioms, condition H and condition A. In the remainder of the !~per we continue 
to require that individual preferences satisfy the vNM axioms. Particularly during 
the last two decades much empirical evidence has been presented flint descrip- 
tively individual preferences frequently violate these axioms. Normatively the 
axioms still have considerable force and are appealing enough to adhere to. We 
will also continue to assume that condition A holds. Condition A asserts that the 
identity of a QALY recipient should play no role in health decision making. 
Condition A ensures that the principle that a life in full health should be equal for 
all individuals holds, and thereby allows consistent scaling of the utility functions 
according to the equity principles developed by Gafni and Birch (1991). More- 
over, as the example in the previous ection shows, condition A does not predict 
choice with respect o every allocation and therefore allows additional equity 
principles to be imposed. 
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The remainder of the paper examines the consequences of relaxing the two 
remaining conditions, that social preferences satisfy the vNM axioms and condi- 
tion H. The restrictiveness of these assumptions can be illustrated by means of an 
example. Consider two individuals (or equivalently two groups of individuals) and 
two possible states of the world. X and Y, each with a probability of occurrence of 
0~5. Thi~ pmb.'~__b_;IL'y !~L~".~ :o boil. imiividua~s. Consider the following fi~ee 
health care ptogrammes ach resulting in different QALY allocations: 
Programme State X State Y Expected utility 
1 (1, 0) (1, O) 1 
2 (1, 0) (0, l) 1 
3 (I, I) (0, O) ! 
Under the assumptions being made, by Theorem 1, social indifference should hold 
between the three health care programmes, given that the expected utilities of the 
three programmes are equal. However, it is conceivable that the decision maker 
will prefer progranunes 2 and 3 to programme ! given that the former two 
ptogranunes offer b~h individuals a possibility of receiving a QALY, whereas 
progrmmrte 1 denies the second individual the possibility of receiving a QALY. 
Diamond (1967) o has argued that it is essentially vNM independence that requires 
indifference to hold in the above example. (See also Sen (1976), Broome (1982) 
and Ulph (1982). For a counter-argument see Harsanyi (1975).) This is most easily 
seen by comparing programmcs 1 and 2. Under condition A, the decision maker is 
ind/fferem between the outcomes of the two ~.~rog~'nmcs whea state Y occurs. 
However, under state X the outcomes of the two programmes are equal and 
lberefore, by vNM independence, overall indifference should prevail. On the other 
hand, if the decision maker is concerned with the fairness of the allocation 
process, generally referred m as ex ante equity, programme 2 should be chosen, 
because this offers both individuals a possibility of obtaining a QALY. Incorporat- 
ing ex ante equity concerns implies dismissing the requirement that social prefer- 
ences satisfy the vNM axioms. Incorporating ex ante equity considerations can be 
en~red by imposing the following ex ante equity condition on the social prefer- 
ence relation: 
Comtifion E- - i f  Pk = qk for all k E i \{ io  j}; Pi + Pj = q, + qj and [p~ - pfl < 
Iqi - qfl then P >- :0. 7 
where P and Q are lotteries over X and the pis and qis are marginal probabilities, 
indicating the probability that individual i receives agiven amount of QALYs, QC. 
In words condition E states the following. Suppose all individuals, other than i 
6 S¢~ ~so Sen (1976L Broom¢ (1982) and Ulph (1982). For a counterargumcn~ seeHarsanyi (1975). 
7 C~t~o~ E is c ~  m ~s[~[~'~'s ~ io~ of risk-sharing equity in the context of public risk 
ev~u~km (F~shb~'a. 1984). S¢c also F~shbm'n and S1raffin (1989). 
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and j, have tim same marginal probability of receiving QC under two health care 
programmes (in the above example QC is equal to one). Taken together i and j 
have the same marginal probability of receiving QC, but in one. progranm'~e this 
marginal probability is more equally divided between the two individual~ (in t ho_ 
~P.:,v.~c,~i d i~ i lb~ by condition t:" this is the pro~mme giving rise to probability 
distribution P). Then, by condition E, the progran'ur,e with the more equal 
distribution of marginal probabilities over i and j is to be preferred to the one that 
leads to a less equal distribution of marginal probabilities over i and j. 
Condition E is not incompatible with condition H. Condition E dictates how 
differences in marginal probabilities hould affect social preference, whereas 
condition H dictates how equality of marginal probabilities should affect social 
preference. 
It is also conceivable that, in choosing between programmes 2 and 3, a social 
decision maker prefers programme 3 to programme 2, given 0mr programme 3 
guarantees an equal disttrbution of QALYs under both states of the world, whereas 
programme 2 necessarily leads to a situation of inequality. This preference is
determined by a concern for the final distribution of QALYs, often referred to as 
ex post equity. Let Pi - j denote the probability of the event hat only individual i
gets a QALY and let p, + j denote the probability of the event hat both individual 
i and individual j receive a QALY. In the example above, P i - j  is 0.5 for 
programme 2 and 0 for programme 3, whereas p~ + j is 0 for progranun¢ 2 and 0.5 
for programme 3. Incorporating a concern for ex post equity can be esmhlis~d by 
imposilig t;~ foiiowing condition on the social preference r lation: 
Conditioa P - - i f  P = Q, P, Q ~ Zapart from p~_j = q~_j - % pj_, = qj_ ~ - % 
Pi+j -~ qi~j + "~" with "/> 0, then P >- :Q. s 
It can easily be seen that condition P is incompatible with condition H. In the 
situation described by condition P, Pi = qi for all individuals, so by condition H, 
P ,,, =Q. However, probability distribution P offers a greater probability of 
individuals i and j both receiving a QALY. Therefore, by condition P, P >- =Q. 
Thus, incorporating ex post equity considerations in heath care decision making 
means rejection of condition H. Condition H, innocuous as it may appear, has the 
effect of making social choice dependent on individual preferences only. The 
condition leaves no room for supra-individual interests. Incorporating distribu- 
tional concerns therefore means relaxing the condition that social choice depends 
only on individual preferences and allowing complementarity between individual 
utility/health levels. In the next section two approaches are discussed to incorpo- 
rate such complementarity. 
8 This condition isthe converse ofKeeney's as~mp~ion of calastrop~ avoklance (Keeaey. 1980). 
Fishbum (1984) ~ Fishbum and SL,'affin (1989) have developed sim/lar "'common fate equity" 
axioms for the context of public risk evaluation. 
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7. Ex past equity algoritllnns for QALY aggregation 
Z 1. A multiplicatire social utili~' fimcHon 
As has been observed in the proof of Theorem i. condition H is equivalent to 
additive independence (Fishbum, 1965, 1970). Therefore, a way to introduce 
complementari~ is to translate generalizations of additive independence, known 
from the literature on multi-attribute utility theory, to the context of social choice. 
One possibility is to impose the analogue of mutual utility independence on the 
social preference relation. '~ Mutual utility independence is a preference condition 
that is entirely formulated in terms of lotteries on outcomes. I deviate slightly from 
this approach by making as little use of lotteries as possible in the conditions 
imposed on the social preference relation. The main motivation underlying my 
approach is that lotteries are highly artificial constructs that are typically not 
available in real-world health decision situations. This does not imply that lotteries 
have no rode to play in health decision making. They are, for example, necessary 
in smnda~ gamble measurements. The reason I have avoided the use of conditions 
that are formulated in terms of lotteries is that in my opinion such conditions are 
harder to understand than conditions that are formulated in terms of certainty~ The 
ultimate aim of characterizations is to clarify what assumptions a particular 
representation depends on. The easier the preference conditions arc to understand 
the ea.gier it is to assess the appeal of representations. An additional motivation to 
use the independence condition SE stated below is that this condition is more 
common in social choice theory and that a justification for imposing it has ~en 
given. ,o 
Condition SE the social preference relation satisfies condition SE if for all 
QALY allocations x. x'. y. y'  ~ X, for all sub~!s of individuals A c I = { i . . . . .  
n}: 
[ r_~, :,-., k "-. ,  Y.~ l ** [ w_., xA > w_~ :'~1 
By condition SE. individuals who are indifferent between two QALY alloca- 
tions, the individuals who are not in subset A. exert no influence on social 
preference. Condition SE is the analogue of the "'sure thing principle" in decision 
making under uncemainty {Savage, 1954) and of "'complete strict .separability" in
consumer theory (Blackorby et al.. 1978). Condition SE underlies the current 
practice of using incremenhal nalysis in cost utility analysis (see, for example. 
Drummond et al., 1987). Incremental nalysis prescribes how to calculate the net 
advantage of one programme over another. The implication of this is that if two 
programmes produce the same amount of QALYs for certain individuals, then 
'~ Fo~ a definition of mutual utilRy independence se . tbr example. Keeney and Raiffa (1976. p. 289). 
i~ For a defen~ see Fleming {|952): Deschamps and Gevers (1978); Sen (1976. 1977). 
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these individuals do not influence the outcome of the analysis. This is exactly wh~,_ 
condition SE asserts. 
Condition SE is entirely formulated under conditions of certainty. However, 
because we seek a representation for the social preference relation under condi- 
tions of risk, we have to impose a condition which is defined with respect o 
preferences under risk. Consider the following condition: 
Condition Ul-- let  B be a subset of individuals, i.e. B c ! = { I . . . . .  n}, let y be 
a particular constant QALY allocation, y ~- X, and let > =j, be the preference 
relation defined over probability distributions on R+ a by fixing the values of 
those individuals outside subset B ( !  - B) at levels identical to those of y. B is 
u0,lity independent if > :!,. is independent of the constant value at which y is 
fixed. 
In the special case where all probability distributions are degenerate, i.e. one 
outcome results with probability one, condition U! is equivalent to condition SE. 
If condition Ui holds for all subsets of individuals B, mutual utility independence 
holds. However, in combination with condition SE it is not necessary to impose 
condition U! for all subsets of individuals. It is sufficient o impose that U! holds 
for one individual, Thus, if all other n - ! individuals are indifferent between two 
QALY allocations, then social preferences for lotteries on these two allocations are 
governed by the preferences of this pm"ticular individual. Denote this condition as 
uf .  Condition U! j only holds when all other individuals are indifferent. The 
relevant individual can therefore not be considered to be a dictator in Arrow's 
sense. Condition U! ~ is an artificial condition, because s:,tuations like the one 
de~ribed in the condition will rarely occur ,~nd this makes it hard to assess the 
condition. However. condition U! ~ '~s not very restrictive in terms of the social 
preference relation. If the one individual for who condition U! I holds, is the 
individual who is worst off in terms of health, then it .seems defensible to impose 
that. in case all other individuals are indifferent, social preferences under risk 
should be governed by the preferences under risk of this individual. 
A ~cond theorem can now be given. 
Theorem 2--the following two statements are equivalent: 
(i) The social preference relation can be represented by 
n 
u(x) = ( I /A ) ] - I [~U( .~, )  + l] - ( l /~)  (4) 
i=1  
where U(x)  is a continuous ocial utility function, uniq~e up to positive linear 
transformations and scaled between 0 and 1, the U(x~) are identical additive 
utility functions, that can be interpreted as (reseated) QALYs and A is a scaling 
constant, hat is not equal to zero. 
(ii) Both individual and social preferences satisfy the vNM axioms: social 
preferences satisfy conditions A, SE and Ull. 
If condition P also holds then A > 0. 
A proof of this result can be found in Appendix A. 
80 H. Olek-hrodt / Journal of Health Economics 16 f 1997) 65-91 
. . . . . .  ~s v~,~;t~,  A reflects the influence of complementarity. For exam- 
pie, for two i ra : f i ves  Eq. (4) reduces to 
u(x)  = u(x , )  + ~J(x,_) + au( x, )u( x_, ) (5) 
If A > O, comple,'~,~nharir~y increase~ social utility, which is the effect of imposing 
Conskler the e~ampk~ of the two individuals nl and the three health care 
descr i '~ in Section 6. Recalculating the social utility of health care 
progranm~es |, 2 a~ 3 gives 1, ! and I +0.5A, respectively. Thus, under 
condit~m P, p~g~mme. 3 is now preferred, which is consistent with the (im- 
posed) preference for ex post equity, ludifference still holds between programmes 
I and 2. because they [have the same distributional implications. Indifference 
be~-een Wogr, tp'znes I a~l 2 reflects the fact that ex ante equity has not been 
~en into accoum. 
The value of A reflects, views on equity. These views can either he those of a 
policy maker or those of the general public. The question whose views are more 
~ e  is not the subject matter of this paper. Views on equity can partly be 
expressed by conclitic~s such as condition P, but to determine the relative weight 
given to aggregating the individual QALYs (the efficiency side) and to comple- 
mentarity between indi~,/dual QALYs (the ex post equity side) requires explicit 
choices with respect o hhe equity-efficiency trade-off. Trading off attributes is 
common practice in n~Iti-attribute utility theory and the tools of multi-attribute 
utility theory ~.'~n be of great help in eliciting preferences between efficiency and 
equ/ty in ~th  care. 
Under condition A cue trade-off question is sufficient o determine A. As an 
i i i~ ,  co, Js/der aga/n the example of two individuals. In Theorem 2. the 
U~.~) are rescalcd QALYs (for more details see the proof of Theorem 2 in 
Appendix A): A~U'(x,) where all A, are equal and positive and U'(x~) indicates 
t~ number of QALYs ,.-ach individual receives. For the purpose of the theorem 
this was no problem gi'~en that vNM utility functions are unique up to positive 
l i~ar t r -~ ,~sf~.  ~i~'ever, to calculate A we need to determine A,. This can 
be done by ask/rig forth.- indifference probability p in the choice between (1, O) " 
with ce~ainty and a gamble with outcomes (I, 1) with probability p and (0, 0) 
with proba~lity (l -p ) .  Suppose the indifference probability is 0.4. Scale U(x) 
such that U( |. I) = I. Tilen. substituting values in Eq. (5). ! = 0.4, ! + 0.4.1 + 
A*0.4* I *0.4* I. This g~ves A = |.25. It is conceivable that exact values for A 
cam~ be specifi¢~l in every situation, but only a range of values. In that case it 
seems ensible to include this range of values for A in sensitivity analyses. 
H To ~ f~maliy co~¢~.1, fi~ two L~ividuals a strongec ondition than SE has to be imposed: the 
a ,~gu¢ of W~kL~r's hcxagolt ¢~',~c~. ~.'.dch ~,'ii] be discussed in Section 8 (Wakker. 1989). 
iz Or CO. D ~h/ch. u~gk~r c~d/~km A. is e,~ivah:m to (i. O). 
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Finally, the multiplicative social utility function, as derived above, only incor- 
porates equity concerns to a limited extent. By condition SE, indifferent individu- 
als do not exert an influence on social preference. In a situation where the 
non-indifferent individuals are already in a good health state but the indifferent 
individuals are in an appalling health state, it may be preferred that the non-indif- 
ferent individuals do not receive more QALYs in order to prevent a more unequal 
distribution of health (utility). Such equity concerns cannot be accommodated by 
the proposed multiplicative social utility function. In the next section we propose a 
social utility function that is able to embrace x post equity concerns in a more 
comprehensive way. 
Z2. A m~o-component social utility function 
Continue to assume that social preferences satisfy the vNM axioms. Therefore, 
as in Sections 5 and 7.1, the social preference relation is defined c~ver probability 
distributions. We propose a method that allows the decision maker :o simultane- 
ously consider the maximization of QALYs, that can both be interpretea s he~!th 
and utility, and the distribution of these QALYs, that is ex post equity. The idea is 
to assess a two-compouent social utility function U(y)= U(yl, Y,.), the compo- 
nents of which are the total number of QALYs (Yt) and a real valued summary 
index reflecting the ex post distribution of these QALYs (y.,). The set of 
outcomes, Y, is assumed to satisfy certain structural assumptions, t3 The assess- 
ment of such a two-component multi-attrtrbute utility function becomes much 
easier if the following assumption can be accepted. 
Condition TCI (two-component independence)mif two lotteries induce the 
same probability distribution over Y~ (total number of  QALYs gained) and the 
same probability distribution over Y, (the summary index reflecting the ex post 
distribution), then these lotteries are indifferent. 
This condition is similar to additive independence (and to condition H for the 
special case of two individuals) and guarantees, in combination with the assump- 
tion that the social preference relation ~tisfies the vNM axioms, by Theorem 2 in 
Fishbum (1965) that U(y)  is additive: 
U(y) ~- a,u,(y,)  + a ,u : (y , )  (6) 
where U, U t and U, axe sc',fled vNM utility functions, and A I and A, are scaling 
constants that reflect views on the trade-off between "'efficiency" in the sense of 
the maximization of QALYs and ex post equity. 
t* g is assumed tobe a Cartesian product of Y~ and g_,. Yt ~ IR÷\{0} and ~ ~ IR+. The reason tha~ 
0 is excluded from Y~ is that otherwi~ not every value from }'1 can be como~d with every value 
from Y_, and. by consequence. Y cannot be a Cartesian product. 
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The suramary index defined over the ex post distribution should satisfy certain 
properties. For example, it should be sensitive to a transfer from an individual who 
is relatively well off in terms of the number of QALYs received from the 
implementation f a health care programme, to an individual who receives less 
QALYs from this programme. An example of such a summary index is Theii's 
entropy measure (cf. Sen, 1973): 
n 
y, = ~x,  ln(nxi) (7) 
i=]  
where .r~ denotes the share of the total amount of QALYs received by indi,<idual 
i. y_, increases with inequality in the QALY distribution, therefore, under condi- 
tion P, A_,U(y,) must have a negative sign. 
Assume that condition TCI holds. Assume further that the utility function for 
the amount of QALYs is linear )4 and that the utility function for the ex post 
distribution is equal to Theil's entropy index. Then for the example in Section 6 
we ob~n:  U(programme !) = U(programme 2) = A) + A, In 2; U(programme 
3) = A n. Under condifioh P A_, < 0, and thus programme 3 is preferred, consistent 
with a preference for ex post equity. 
Only one trade-off question has to he asked to determine the scaling constants, 
A n and Ae. Suppose that a programme yields benefits for two groups of individuals 
and that the maximum amount of QALYs the programme can generate is 100. 
Then the best possible outcome is (50. 50): the number of QALYs is maximized 
and there is no inequality. Scale U(.) such that U(50, 50) = 1. The worst outcome 
is (x. 0) in which x is infinitesimally small: the number of QALYs is minimized 
and there is complete inequality. Let U(x, 0) be zero. Now A) can be determined 
by elicifing the indifference probability in a choice between (100, 0), i.e. the 
numher of QALYs is at its maximum, but inequality is complete, for certain and a 
gamble giving (50. 50) with probability p and (x, 0) with probability (! -p ) .  
Suppose p=0.85 .  Substituting in Eq. (6) gives: U(100, 0)=Aj  * l=p.  Thus 
Ai =0.85 and A_, is by consequence equal to 0.15. 
i f  condition TC! does not hold, complementarity het~een y~ and y_, has to be 
introduced in the model. For example, if the social preference relation does not 
smisfy condition TCI. but does satisfy a .somewhat s ronger condition than 3"E (the 
hexagon condition), and does satisfy Ui ), ~en the term AA)A,UI(yl)U.:(y, . )
should be added to the additive form. reflecting complementarity. In this case one 
additional trade-off question has to he asked to determine the scaling constants. 
~" This a.,.sum[~h)n may apDear res~"ictive. However. i[ reflects, the impact of [he efficiency side in the 
decisi~) ~'r~-;n~ Dfoces,.,; ~*ue of the arguments of the overall utility function isthe maximization f the 
amoun{ of QALYs. To represem the efficiency side of the decision making process the total amount of 
QALYs ~ems a good indicator. If the linear function is no~ he|iew-'d tobe aI~prapriate, alternative 
functicma| t'o~s can sira[fly be sub~tueed. 
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8. Algorithms incorporating both ex post and ex ante equity 
In Section 6 it was argued that if a concern for ex ante equity is to be 
incorporated in social preference, the vNM utility function can no longer be used. 
Therefore, in this section, rather than taking a preference relation over probability 
distributions as primitive, a representation is sought for a preference r lation under 
certainty. In this section we consider a three component social value function 
V(y )= V(y  I, Y2, Ys), where Yl, Y2 and Y3 denote the number of QALYs gained, 
which can be both utilities and health, and real valued summary indices reflecting 
the ex post equity and the ex ante equity of the QALY allocation process, 
respectively. More specifically, we will derive a representation for the value 
function V(y~ e, Y3) ~s in which y~-e denotes the certainty equivalent amount of 
QALYs gained, with the ex post equity index held fixed, for probability distribu- 
tions over y~ and y,. For example, if the ex post equity index is fixed at its 
optimal value co~esponding with no inequality, then for every lottery the equiva- 
lent number of equally distributed QALYs is determined. Under the assumption 
that .~cial preferences increase monotonically with the number of QALYs, which 
seems reasonable and is typically assumed in cost utility analysis, the equivalent 
number of QALYs will consistently rank order lotteries, a higher number corre- 
sponding to more preferred. V(y~ "~, Y3) is equivalent to V(U(y I, y,), Y3) in which 
U is a vNM utility function defined over y~ and y_,. By means of the soCal value 
function the certainty equivalent number of QALYs of a gamble can be waded off 
against its ex ante equity implications. Thus we :ontinue to assume that social 
preferences with respect to lotteries over y~ and y_, while holding Y3 fixed satisfy 
the vNM ~ioms. vNM utility functions are still used to evaluate attributes Yl and 
y,.  because x ante equity is defined in the context ~:f risk and therefore utility 
functions that are applicable in the context of decision making under risk are 
called for. Social policy making is essentially a normative decision problem, and 
to date there is no theory that challenges expected utility theory as a normative 
theory of decision making under risk. Diamond's objection against vNM utility 
theory concerned its implications for ex ante equity (Diamond, 1967). His 
argument does not conflict with the use of vNM utility functions to evaluate Yt 
and y,. We will describe the preference conditions that make it possible to 
represent V(y) by the following simple expression: 
v(y) -- K,v, [ ~,t/,(y,) + ,~:~( y:)] + ,,,v3(y,) (8) 
where Ut and U 2 are (scaled) vNM utility functions, and Vt and V 3 are (.scaled) 
value functions. 
is The .set Y is again assumed tohe a Cartesian product ~t. it is ~ssumed that 1/I ~ IR+\{O}: 1/2. 
E~ ~ IR,. in combination with the .~ssumption that > on ¥ is a weak order, this guarantees the 
existence of V(Y). If >_ on Y is moreo~er a.~sumed to he continuous, then V(Y) will he contima~as. 
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Consider the following preference condition: 
Hexagon condition--if [(y[~', Y3) "" ( .v~ , y~) and ( .v~ 0, Y3) " ( .vC~'l, Y~) ~md 
(Yt '°, Y~) ~ (YV, Y~)] then (v "~* • ! • Y3)~(Y~+' ,  Y~)-  
Suppose that y~~' >- y~¢' >- y[e and that y~ >- y~ >- Y3- By the first two indiffer- 
ences in the hexagon condition, both the utility difference between y~' and y[~ 
and the utility difference between y'i ~" and y~' are just sufficient o compensate 
the utility difference between Y3 and Y3- Then the third and +he (implied) fourth 
indifference assert hat if the utility difference between y[~' and y~ is also just 
sufficient o compensate he utility difference between y.~ and y.~, then the utility 
difference between y~"+ and y[~' should also be just sufficient o compensate abe 
utility difference between y~ ,and y~. The hexagon condition is, under transitivity 
of the indifference relation, implied by the Thomson condition, which has been 
more commonly used as a characterizing condition for an additive two attribute 
utility funct~ (e.g. Deineu, 1960). 
Given that the hexagon condition holds, a preference relation > ~ can be 
defined over probability distributions on Yl and Y2, while fixing Y3 at some 
constant reference value. This preference relation is assumed to satisfy the vNM 
axioms and condition TCI (two-comlx~nent i dependence). 
The following p+~sult can then be siated. 
Theorem 3--the following are equivalent: 
(i) V (Y )  can be represented by Eq. (8). 
(ii) The social preference r lation on Y is a continuous weak order that ~tisfies 
the hexagon condition+ and > a satisfies the vNM axioms and condition TCI. 
Furthermore. V, U I. U,_ and V 3 are continuous and unique up to positive linear 
transformations. The A+s are scaling constants. 
A proof of ~his theorem can be found in Appendix A. 
The summary index y.~, reflecting ex ante equity, should be sensitive to 
changes between individuals in the marginal probability of obtaining a given 
anmunt of QALYs, Q". The fo!lowin~ index has this property: 
Y3 = ( l /n )  ~ ( q+ - q,~)z (9) 
where q, denotes lhe marginal probability of individual i receiving Q' and q,, 
denotes the mean probability of receiving Q<. A more equal distribution of 
marginal probabilities leads to a lower value for the summary index. Therefore. 
under condition E. t%V~(y.~) should be negative. The amount of QALYs with 
respect o which q~ mid q,~ are defined should be chosen according to what it is 
believed that individuals are entitled to. For example, if the conviction exists that 
every individual should have an equal probability of receiving a life in full health 
il~n q~ dermies the individual probability of obialning a life in full health. 
Suppose v~i*.h respect o the example of Section 6 that the conditions of 
Theorem 3 hold and that U~. U z. V~ and V 3 are identity functions, i.e. U,(y~) = y~, 
with y., a~ Y3 as in Eqs. (7) and (9). respectively. Then V(programme I) = KI(A ~ 
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+ A_, In 2) + 0.25A3: V(programme 2) = KI(A I + Az In 2); V(programme 3) -~ 
h I Aj. Imposing conditions E and P has the effect of making A, and A 3 both 
negative. Therefore, under conditions E and P the resulting ranking of the health 
care programmes i  3 >- 2 >- 1. 
The assessment of the scaling constants follows from a procedure similar to the 
one outlined at the end of Section 7.2. The only difference is that in this case two 
trade-off questions have to be asked given that there is one additional scaling 
constant (one of the Ks) to assess. The additive value functions Vj and V 3 can be 
assessed along the lines sketched in Section 3.7 in Keeney and Raiffa (1976). 
Condition TCI is a restrictive condition. Complementarity between U(y I) and 
U( Y2 ) can be introduced by replacing condition TCI by the weaker condition of 
mutual utility independence b tween y~ and Y2. If condition TC! is replaced by 
mutual utility independence, but the other conditions of Theorem 3 still hold. V(y) 
can be represented by the following equation: 
v(y) = K,V, [ a,U,(y,) + A_, U_,(y:) + aa, a,u,( y~)V,_( y_,)] + ~v~(y3) 
(,0) 
This follows from Theorem (6.1) in Keeney and Raiffa (1976). In Eq. (10) 
three tr,~e-off questions have to be asked to determine all the scaling constants: 
a I, a, and one o fK  t and r 3. 
9. Summary and discussion 
The aim of this paper was to derive equity algorithms for utility-based decision 
making. Because QALYs are the most commonly encountered utility based 
measure in the health economics literature, the paper focused on QALY-based 
decision making. However, it should be emphasized once again that the results of 
the paper are entirely general: they apply to other utility-based outcome measures 
as well. Two interpretations of QALYs were considered: QALYs as (vNM) 
utilities and QALYs as measures of health. In the interpretation of QALYs as 
utilities, an important issue that has to be resolved is the question whether utilities 
can be interpersonally compared. The possibility of aggregating utilities over 
individuals has been heavily debat~ within the economic science. Sections 3 and 
4 provided a justification for aggregating QALYs as consistently scaled vNM 
utilities over individuals. 
Section 5 provided a characterization f unweighted aggregation of QALYs. It 
was shown that two of the conditions underlying the common practice of 
unweighted aggregation of QALYs over individuals are at variance with two types 
of equity cancems: a concern for the final distribution of the number of QALYs 
(ex post equity) and a concern for the fairness of the QALY allocation process (ex 
ante equity). By relaxing these two conditions, alternative aggregation procedures 
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were derived that take into account (some of the) equity considerations. Even 
though these alternative aggregation procedures are less restrictive than un- 
weighF~l QALY aggregation, they still impose restrictions on social preferences 
that may not be tenable in every decision context. Further generalizations of these 
alternative aggregation procedures are possible. One road to explore is whether 
results from rank dependent utility theory, currently the n-lost popular alternative 
for expected utility theory in decision making under risk and uncertainty, can be 
Wanslated to the context of social decision making. The idea underlying rank 
dependent u ility flm~-y is tha~ different outcomes/individuals getassigned iffer- 
ent weights. This is basically the idea underlying the equity principles proposed in 
this paper. 
paper further shows that incorporating equity concerns can be achieved at 
relatively low cost: two additional trade-off questions are in general sufficient. 
Obviously, trade-offs between efficiency and equity considerations are not always 
easy m make. However, this can be no excuse for not making this trade-off 
explicit. As shown in this paper, multi-atmbute utility theory can he of great help 
here. 
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Appendix A
A.I. Proof of Theorem i 
Condition H is in fact equivalent to the condition of additive independence, 
which is familiar in multi-at:ribute utility theory. Additive independence asserts 
that preferences with respect o lotteries over aitematives depend only on the 
marginal probability of each outcome occurring and not on the joint probability 
dis~bution. Given that it It:as been assumed that > = has been defined over a set 
of (simple) probability distributions, and satisfies the von N,~umann Morgenstem 
axioms, Theorem l I.I in Fishbum (1970) can he applied (see also Theorem 4 in 
Fishbum (1965)). According to this theorem, 
n 
U{x)  = ~. Ui(:L) (AI) 
i=! 
where r~¢ U,(xi). called additive individual utility functions, are defined from the 
expected utility of ~ degenerate lottery that gives outcome -L with probability I. 
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Given the fact that the additive individual utility functions U~(x i) are unique up to 
similar positive linear transformations, it follows that the Ais in Harsanyi's 
theorem are positive. This guarantees positive association between individual and 
social preferences, one of the conditions from the work of Arrow (1951a). 
Imposing condition A on top of the other conditions leads to the QALY 
utilitarian representation. If (U~ /7_, . . . . .  U n) is an array of representing additive 
individual utility functions, then by condition A so are (U 2, U 3 . . . . .  Un), (U 3, 
u4 . . . . .  u~. ~)  . . . . .  (un. u, . . . . .  un-,) .  Then {O/n) r - ,~ .  (I/n)~:U~ . . . . .  
(l/n)~iU,} is representing aswell and so, by the uniqueness properties of the U,, 
is (~  . . . . .  ~iU~). This shows that the additive individual utility functions can be 
chosen identical. Set U equal to one of these additive individual utility functions: 
this gives the desired result. 
Continuity follows from the continuity of > and from Theorem 3.2 in Maas 
and Wakker (1994). Additive independence implies utility independence, which in 
turn implies independence. The structural assumptions made in Section 5.1 ensure 
that the other conditions in Maas and Wakker (1994) are fulfilled. Weak order has 
been assumed. Restricted solvability and the Archimedean axiom follow from the 
fact that X i = R+ and X= R~.. R+ is endowed with the usual Euclidean 
topology, which is connected and separable. R~ is endowed with the product 
topology and, by Theorem 5,3 in Fishbum (1970), is connected and separable. By 
the proof of Theorem 6.14 in Krantz et al. (1971), continuity of > with respect to 
a connected product opology implies restricted solvability and the Archimedean 
axiom. 
A.2. Pr¢u~f of Theorem 2
By Maas and Wakker (1994. Theorem 3.2) conditions SE and I711 are 
equivalent to utility independence for all subsets of I--{1 . . . . .  n} and U is 
continuous. Then by Theorem 6.1 in Keeney and Raiffa (1976), if A ~:0, U(x) 
can be written as 
n 
Au(~)  + 1 = 1 - I [ ,~ ,~(x , )  + l] (az )  
i~ l  
where U(x) and the /7, are scaled between 0 and 1. Suppose the U~ are scaled 
according to the algorithm proposed by G~ni and Birch (199I). Then a life in full 
heal,q'~ has utility I for all individuals. If A = 0, it follows from Eq. (6.12) in 
Keeney and Raiffa (1976) that U(x) can be written as Eq. (AI), which in 
combination with condition A gives QALY-utilitarianism. 
Suppose without loss of generality that (0, 0 . . . . .  O) is the worst social 
aiiocation and set U(0, 0 . . . . .  0) = 0, which is allowed by free scaling of the 
utility function. By condition A: (x, 0, 0 . . . . .  0)',, :(0, x. 0 . . . . .  0 )~:  . . . . .  
• '- :(0, 0 . . . . .  0, x). Substitute this in Eq. (A2) to give AA~U~(x)= AA_,U_,(x)= 
... = AA~U,,(x). Thus all A~U~ are equal. Set these equal to U(xi). Rearranging 
terms gives Eq. (4). 
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Denote by [p, x; ( ! -p ) ,  y] a programme that gives allocation x with 
probability p, and allocation y with probability (1 -p ) .  By condition P, [0.5, (x, 
x, 0 . . . . .  0): 0.5, (0, O, . . . .  0)] is preferred to [0.5, (x, O, . . . .  0); 0.5,( O, x, O, . . . .  
0)]. Calculating the expected utility of these two programmes making use of Eq. 
(4) gives 
0.5" [( I / ,~)" ( au{ x) + l)  ~ - ( l / ,~) ]  
> o.5" [t ~/a)" (ave ~,) + l) - C l /a t ]  
+ 0.5" [( l /A)"  ( AU(x) + 1) - ( l /A) ]  (A3) 
Under the assumption that a QALY is a vNM utility, i.e. U(x)= x, Eq. (A3) can 
be rewritten as 
( l /2a) ' (ax+ l ) " - ( l /2a)>( l la ) ' (ax+ 1) -  ( l /a )  (A4) 
which, alter rearranging terms, gives Ax/2  > 0. Given our assumption that x is 
non-negative and in this particular case cannot equal zero, it follows that A > O. 
A.3. Prmof o f  Theorem 3 
Given that Y is assumed to be a Cartesian product, that the one-attribute 
subsets are intervals in the real numbers, that it is implicitly assumed that the 
decision maker thinks both attributes of V( Y ) should influence social preference 
(i.e. both attributes are essential), and that > on Y is a continuous weak order 
that satisfies the hexagon condition, by Theorem III.4.1. in Wakker (1989), V(Y) 
can be represented by 
V(y) -- K,VI(y~') + K31/~ (Y3) (A5) 
with V and the additive value functions V, scaled between 0 and 1. continuous and 
un/que up to similar positive linear transformations. The K, are scaling constants. 
Equivalently, Eq. (A5) can be written as 
! /(y)  = Ice  [U t "" .Yz)] - K i t ,  y , )  . . . .  , I, r ' ,u I  ! tL  % - '1  3"3% . . 
Given thai condition TCl is equivalent to additive independence for two attributes, 
Theorem 2 in Fishburn (1965) can he applied to give 
V(y)  = KiVl[ h~Ul(Yl) + A-'Uz( Y.')] + K3V3(Y3) (A7) 
where the U, are scaled between 0 and 1, unique up to similar positive linear 
transformations and are continuous given continuity of V t. 
Finally. it remains to be shown that y~< can always be determined. By 
continuity of ~ vNM utility function it is possible to find a certainty equivalent 
for every, lottery over y~ and Yz- Furthermore, given continuity of V, > a 
restricted to degenerate probability distributions is continuous. By the vNM 
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axioms E a is a weak order. Finally y~ and Yz are elements o f  intervals in the 
real numbers. Thus, by Lemma III.3.3. in Wakker (1989), _> a satisfies restricted 
solvability. Suppose (Yu, Y2) denotes the certainty equivalent o f  a loRery. By 
restricted solvabil ity i f  (a  n, x)>-A(Yn, Y2)>'A (Cn, X) where x denotes tim value 
at which the ex post equity index is held fixed, then there exists (b  n, x )  such that 
(b  n, x )  ~ a (YP Y'.)" I f  we fix x at the value corresponding to no inequality then 
there will exist such (a  n, x )  and (c  n, x )  and thus y can always be determined. 
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